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Athena Demertzi, Andrea Soddu and Steven Laureys
Functional neuroimaging shows that patients with disorders of
consciousness exhibit disrupted system-level functional
connectivity. Unresponsive/’’vegetative state’’ patients
preserve wakefulness networks of brainstem and basal
forebrain but the cerebral networks accounting for external
perceptual awareness and internal self-related mentation are
disrupted. Specifically, the ‘external awareness’ network
encompassing lateral fronto-temporo-parietal cortices
bilaterally, and the ‘internal awareness’ network including
midline anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal and posterior cingulate/
precuneal cortices, are functionally disconnected. By contrast,
patients in minimally conscious state ‘minus’, who show non-
reflex behaviors, are characterized by right-lateralized recovery
of the external awareness network. Similarly, patients who
evolve to minimally conscious state ‘plus’ and respond to
commands recover the dominant left-lateralized language
network. Now, the use of active experimental paradigms
targeting at detecting motor-independent signs of awareness
or even establishing communication with these patients,
challenge these two clinical boundaries. Such advances are
naturally accompanied by legitimate neuroscientific and ethical
queries demanding our attention on the medical
implementations of this new knowledge.
Address
Coma Science Group, Cyclotron Research Center & CHU Neurology
Department, Alle´e du 6 aouˆt n8 8, Sart Tilman B30, University of Lie`ge,
4000 Lie`ge, Belgium
Corresponding author: Demertzi, Athena (a.demertzi@ulg.ac.be)
Current Opinion in Neurobiology 2013, 23:239–244
This review comes from a themed issue on Macrocircuits
Edited by Steve Petersen and Wolf Singer
For a complete overview see the Issue and the Editorial
Available online 27th December 2012
0959-4388/$ – see front matter, # 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2012.12.003
What is ‘minimally conscious’?
At present there is no generally accepted definition of
consciousness [1]. As clinicians, we will reduce the com-
plexity of this term and define consciousness operation-
ally, separating two main components: wakefulness and
awareness [2]. Wakefulness has been shown to critically
depend upon the functional integrity of subcortical arou-
sal systems over 50 years ago [(e.g., see 3)]. The level of
wakefulness can be estimated by simple behavioral
criteria based on eye opening ranging from absent, over
stimulus-induced to spontaneous sustained eye opening.
For instance, every night when falling asleep, we experi-
ence a decrease of the level of wakefulness up to the point
we lose awareness of our environment. Awareness is more
difficult to define and more challenging to assess beha-
viorally [4]. We have recently proposed to reduce the
phenomenological complexity of awareness into two
further components: external awareness, namely every-
thing we perceive through our senses (what we see, hear,
feel, smell and taste), and internal awareness or stimulus-
independent thoughts. Interestingly, the switch between
the external and internal milieu was found not only to
characterize overt behavioral reports but also had a
cerebral correlate [5]. In particular, it was shown that
behavioral reports of internal awareness were linked to
the activity of midline anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal
areas as well as posterior cingulate/precuneal cortices.
Conversely, subjective ratings for external awareness
seem to correlate with the activity of lateral fronto-par-
ieto-temporal regions (Figure 1). These findings highlight
that the anticorrelated pattern between the internal and
external awareness system is of functional relevance to
conscious cognition. Indeed, in an altered conscious state
like hypnosis, where subjects report awareness alterations
but remain fully responsive, hypnosis-related reductions
in functional connectivity were shown in the external
awareness system parallel to subjective ratings of
increased sense of dissociation from the environment
and reduced intensity of external thoughts [6]. Similar
reductions in external awareness systems have been also
shown for non-responsive conditions, such as deep sleep
and anesthesia [(for a review see 7)]. Taken together
these studies indicate that the two awareness networks
mediate (at least partially) conscious ongoing mentation
under the functions of a wide ‘global neuronal workspace’
[1,8]. An increasing list of evidence favors this hypothesis.
Studies in healthy volunteers on perception in the visual,
somatosensory and auditory domains confirm that the
subtraction between perceived and unperceived stimuli
identifies the lateral frontoparietal associative cortices [8].
Over the past fifteen years we have increased our un-
derstanding of the neural correlates of awareness [9]. The
study of patients with disorders of consciousness provides
unique opportunities to determine the sufficient and
possibly the necessary conditions for conscious cognition
to happen. Patients in coma are unconscious because, by
definition, they cannot be awakened even when intensely
stimulated. Patients will not remain in coma for months or
years in contrast to what is sometimes reported in the
media [10]. In a number of cases, patients will show such a
massive brain damage that all brainstem function will be
irreversibly lost and evolve to brain death [11]. Those
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patients who will show a good recovery after coma classi-
cally will do so within the first days or weeks after the
insult. A substantial fraction of coma patients will recover
near-normal function of the subcortical ‘wakefulness net-
work’ (located in the brainstem) while remaining without
external signs of awareness. This condition of eyes-open
wakefulness was coined ‘persistent vegetative state’ in
the 1970s [12] and more recently it has been described in
more neutral descriptive terms as ‘unresponsive wakeful-
ness syndrome’ [13]. Vegetative/unresponsive (VS/UWS)
patients classically breathe spontaneously and can make a
wider range of movements than can be seen in coma.
Depending on the partial or full recovery of subcortical
wakefulness networks and brainstem function they can
show spontaneous or stimulus-induced eye opening,
blinking to visual threat; have auditory startle responses
or orient the eyes or head to stimuli; show stereotyped
posturing, normal flexion withdrawal to noxious stimu-
lation or grasping; show gag, deglutition, oral reflexes or
vocalizations. For clinicians dealing with acute or chronic
disorders of consciousness, the main challenge is to dis-
entangle these ‘reflex’ or automatic movements from any
‘voluntary’ or ‘willed’ behavior. The recovery of minimal,
inconsistent but reproducible signs of awareness, in the
absence of functional communication or object use, coins
the diagnosis of minimally conscious state (MCS).
Depending on the complexity of these behaviors it was
recently proposed that MCS patients be categorized as
MCS when only showing simple non-reflex move-
ments, such as visual pursuit, orientation to pain or
non-contingent behavior (e.g. smiling to the presence
of a family member and not to others) and MCS+ when
patients recover the ability to respond to simple com-
mands (e.g. move your hand) [14,15].
It is important to stress that when aiming to say mean-
ingful things about patients’ consciousness, we are lim-
ited to make inferences based on patients’ motor behavior
[16]. Most of the time this works fine but, as we will see in
some cases, consciousness can be present in the absence
of consistent motor responsiveness.
Tracking the recovery of consciousness
networks
With the advent of functional neuroimaging (functional
MRI and PET) and electrophysiology (EEG and event
related potentials) the study of residual brain function in
patients with consciousness alterations has provided
unique insights on the underlying brain mechanisms
accounting for the presence of consciousness [17]. Based
on this lesion paradigm, it is thought that consciousness











External awareness network 
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An oversimplified distinction of human awareness into awareness of the environment and of self-related mentation. Experimental works suggests that
these two components have two distinct functionally alternating cerebral correlates. The external awareness network (areas in red) encompasses
mainly lateral bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortices (DLPFC) and posterior parietal cortices (PPC). The internal awareness network (areas in blue)
includes mainly midline posterior cingulate cortex (PCC)/precuneus (Pr) and anterior cingulate (ACC)/medial prefrontal cortices (MPFC). Apart from
cortico-cortical connectivity, connectivity with subcortical structures, such as with the thalamus (Th) is considered to be essential to support
wakefulness and ongoing conscious processing.
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some areas are more critical than others to support con-
sciousness. FDG-PET studies have demonstrated that
when patients recover from coma to VS/UWS, they
recover the wakefulness network (encompassing brain-
stem and basal forebrain) which explains the restoration
of sustained spontaneous or stimulus-induced eye open-
ing and of autonomic functions including spontaneous
breathing [18]. However, recovery from VS/UWS does
not coincide with near-normal metabolic activity in over-
all brain function. Voxel-based analyses between brain
metabolic scans obtained in awake yet unaware VS/UWS
patients compared to healthy controls (between-subject)
or comparisons with recovery of awareness (within-sub-
ject) have highlighted the critical role of the widespread
fronto-temporo-parietal associative cortical network [19].
Recently, FDG-PET data indicate that recovery of MCS-
patients seems to be accompanied by a right-lateralized
recovery of the external awareness network whereas the
presence of command following, defining MCS+, classi-
cally parallels the recovery of the dominant left-latera-
lized language network [20]. Similar results have been
observed in slow wave sleep and general anesthesia [(for
review see 21)]. Interestingly, these findings were also
confirmed in transient dissociative states of unresponsive
wakefulness such as absence seizures, complex partial
seizures or sleepwalking – all characterized by preserved
automatic reflex motor behavior in the absence of
response to commands and showing transient impaired
activity in the fronto-temporo-parietal associative cortical
network [2,22].
The study of coma and related states has shown that
consciousness is not an emergent property of sensory
cortical activation in isolation. Auditory stimulation with
simple clicks in MCS patients activated widespread
temporal auditory areas and most importantly lead to
functional connectivity changes with the external aware-
ness network [23]. Similar activation and connectivity
changes were observed in normal conscious controls
but not in VS/UWS patients were activation was limited
to isolated low-level auditory cortices, functionally dis-
connected from the external awareness network [24]. By
contrast, emotionally salient stimuli, such as baby cries
and the patient’s own name, led to much more wide-
spread temporal activation also recruiting anterior and
posterior midline cortices [25,26]. Similarly, in MCS
patients, presentation of a story told by their mother lead
to more widespread activation [27]. Novel technological
developments now permit to assess the directionality of
this long-range cortico-cortical connectivity. Using
dynamic causal modeling on auditory oddball evoked
potential data obtained with high-density EEG, it was
shown that only MCS patients (but not VS/UWS patients)
showed feedback or top-down connections from higher-
order frontal associative areas to hierarchically lower-level
auditory regions [28]. A study combining transcranial
magnetic stimulation with simultaneously recorded
EEG confirmed the importance of long-range connec-
tivity from the posterior parietal associative cortex. Only
MCS and not VS/UWS patients showed such long-range
connectivity changes. This technique also permitted to
longitudinally follow connectivity changes in patients
who recovered (or failed to recover) from VS/UWS
[29]. These early functional connectivity studies high-
light the importance of connectivity measurements in the
emergence of human conscious awareness. In particular,
global yet specific cerebral functional identification of
thalamo-cortical connectivity has lead to the develop-
ment of thalamic deep brain stimulation paradigms for
the treatment of post-traumatic MCS patients [30].
Within ‘global workspace’, the posterior midline regions
encompassing precuneus and adjacent posterior cingulate
cortex seem to form a critical hub. Indeed, these areas are
the most metabolically active cortical regions in normal
conscious waking, are mostly impaired in patients in coma
or VS/UWS whereas they are minimally active in MCS
patients. Its critical role in consciousness was confirmed
by a much mediatized case of ‘miracle recovery from
coma’ named Terry Wallis [30]. Nineteen years after his
traumatic brain injury this patient was still considered
‘vegetative’ and started to speak. When carefully exam-
ining the patient’s medical files it became clear he was in
a MCS already months after the trauma. Using MRI and
diffusion tensor imaging in Mr. Wallis, Schiff and collab-
orators reported axonal regrowth, nearly two decades after
the acute insult, in the aforementioned posterior midline
structures [31]. This case not only illustrates the problem
of misdiagnosing disorders of consciousness if merely
based on behavioral unstandardized tools [32] but also
the possibility of neural plasticity even many years after
the acute insult [33]. More recent fMRI studies have
confirmed these findings and demonstrated a conscious-
ness-dependent non-linear breakdown in functional con-
nectivity of the so-called default mode ‘midline core’
network when comparing normal consciousness to
MCS, VS/UWS and comatose states [34].
Conclusions
Studying VS/UWS patients has shown that awareness
seems an emergent property of collective critical cor-
tico-thalamo-cortical network dynamics, involving the
frontoparietal global workspace [35]. At the moment, it
remains controversial whether consciousness should be
considered as a binary all-or-none phenomenon or con-
tinuous [36]. Based on clinical experience and on recent
evidence from careful studies in normal healthy volun-
teers [(e.g., 37)] we here consider consciousness on a
continuous non-linear scale.
Despite the best clinical assessment, we are still limited
to make inferences about consciousness based on motor
responsiveness, possibly leading to an underestimation of
conscious awareness. Recently, the so-called ‘active’
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functional neuroimaging or event-related potential para-
digms have been developed to assess motor-independent
responses to commands. The first of such ‘active’ mental
imagery paradigms have been developed using fMRI. In a
collaborative effort between Cambridge and Lie`ge,
healthy volunteers were asked to perform a series of tasks
(e.g., imagine singing a song in your head or imagine your
mother’s face). The most robust and reproducible pat-
terns of brain activation were obtained using motor ima-
gery (i.e., imagine playing tennis) and spatial navigation
(i.e., imaging walking around in your house), leading to
the predicted activation of supplementary motor cortex
and parahippocampal areas respectively [38]. Using this
tool, both teams together with Cornell University, have
identified a series of severely brain damaged patients who
were clinically diagnosed as being VS/UWS or MCS- and
who yet showed robust fMRI evidence of response to
command, and consequently conscious awareness
[39,40,41]. In one of these cases, functional communi-
cation could even be established by explaining to the
patient to do the motor imagery task to communicate ‘yes’
and the spatial navigation task to communicate ‘no’. This
patient, a 22-year-old man who was sent to Lie`ge for a
one-week diagnostic assessment, is another example of
clinical misdiagnosis. Indeed, this patient had the clinical
diagnosis of VS/UWS while standardized behavioral
assessments showed that he was actually in a MCS
[40]. To a series of simple questions (e.g., is your
father’s name Alexander) the automated user-indepen-
dent analysis of the acquired fMRI data classified the
brain’s responses as a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. Correct answers
were obtained and reported by the blinded examiners for
five consecutive questions. Only for the last question no
answer could be elicited merely caused by absent brain
activation. As a consequence, this patient could be con-
sidered as being in a functional locked-in syndrome, given it
was only functional neuroimaging that permitted to estab-
lish the yes–no communication to closed questions (in
contrast to classical locked-in syndrome where an eye-coded
yes–no communication can be established) [15].
Evidently, the study by Monti et al. [40] should be seen as
a proof of concept rather than a practical communication
tool. As soon as the patient was taken out of the MRI
machine, no communication whatsoever was possible.
Hence, portable and cheaper EEG-based equivalents
[(e.g., 42, 43, 44)] have been developed for more routine
clinical use [(for recent review see 45)]. Such brain computer
interfaces (BCI) have already been used successfully in real
clinical settings. It is important to stress that the absence of
brain activation to commands cannot be taken as proof of
absence of consciousness and frequently false negative
results have been reported in MCS+ patients [(e.g., 44)].
Repeated fMRI and EEG BCI assessments would be
needed to increase the confidence for true negative
findings. In addition, we also need to tackle the problem
of false positives, namely the fact that unconscious patients
may show artifact or noise-related activation [46]. Future
studies should deal with these issues in large patient cohort
and also assess test–retest variability of these novel tech-
nologies in this specific context.
In conclusion, our clinical boundaries are increasingly
being challenged by neuroimaging or electrophysiology
studies in patients with disorders of consciousness who
show motor-independent signs of awareness or communi-
cation. Such advances are naturally accompanied by
legitimate neuroscientific and ethical queries, such as
on pain perception and management as well as end-of-
life options [47–50]. In the future, efforts should be made
towards consciousness classification metrics, where system-
level functional neuroimaging and electrophysiology will
provide an objective means to better characterize the
underlying mechanisms accounting for conscious cogni-
tion and its recovery after severe acquired brain injury.
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